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In the mid-1970s, Chile was the first country in Latin America to
start moving away from a model based on pervasive government inter-
vention to one in which the market plays a central role in resource
allocation and in production and consumption decisions. This move to-
ward a market economy was accompanied by a restoration of order in
the public finances in an attempt to reduce inflation to single digit
levels and to put the macroeconomic situation under control. The
changes accomplished since then have been dramatic. At the time the
shift was instituted, the Chilean economy was highly distorted as a
result of the cumulative effects of forty years of interventionist policies
and disregard for the macroeconomic fundamentals. It was dominated
by a very large and intrusive public sector, with severe macroeconomic
unbalances that had their roots in a high public sector deficit, which
reached 25 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1973. Price con-
trols and rationing were widespread, and the financial sector was re-
pressed through the use of controls on nominal interest rates at levels
that were far below inflation.
The Chilean economy went through a major political and economic
crisis in the early 1970s. A deep recession in 1975 was then followed by
a period of recovery and rapid growth that lasted until 1981, when a
new crisis developed. After a costly adjustment effort, growth resumed
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again in 1984. The average growth rate between 1985 and 1997 was 7.4
percent, with 1997 growth at 7.4 percent. This period of high growth
was interrupted in the late 1990s as a result of severe external shocks
(namely, reduced capital inflows, worsening terms-of-trade, and conta-
gion of the Asian, Russian, Brazilian, and Argentine crises) and the
domestic policy response to these shocks.1 Table 1 presents Chile’s main
economic indicators in the 1974-2000 period.
The post-1997 growth slowdown does not have a single cause. Sev-
eral hypotheses have been put forth to explain the situation. One cites
the bad luck resulting from a series of external shocks: terms-of-trade
losses and a slowdown in capital inflows following the Asian crisis. An-
other blames the slowdown on the policy responses to the deterioration in
the external environment. In particular, the inability to achieve a more
balanced mix of monetary and fiscal policy during the 1997–1998 period
put all the weight of reducing expenditures on monetary policy, with
detrimental effects on sectors that are heavily dependent on the interest
rate cost (namely, small and medium-sized enterprises and the construc-
tion sector). A related hypothesis is that the staunch defense of the ex-
change rate band resulted in high interest rates, with similar costs on
the most exposed sectors. A final explanation is that the slowdown re-
sulted from the completion of a high growth cycle associated with the
structural reforms introduced in the 1985–1995 period. According to this
last hypothesis, the favorable supply shock linked to the structural re-
forms of the previous twenty years unleashed a period of high productiv-
ity growth that was completed by the second half of the 1990s.
This paper evaluates Chile’s macroeconomic performance in the sec-
ond half of the 1990s, concentrating on the role played by each of these
competing hypotheses, with a special emphasis on the first two. The rest
of the paper is organized in five sections. Section 1 uses a Solow’s growth
accounting framework to identify the factors contributing to growth from
1951 to 1997, just before the slowdown. Section 2 reviews the main devel-
opments in policies and macroeconomic development in the 1990s to set
the stage for the analysis carried out in the next two sections. Section 3
uses a framework based on nonstructural vector autoregressive (VAR)
models to look at the main factors accounting for the post-1997 slowdown
of the economy. Section 4 uses a small macroeconomic structural model
to assess the economic consequences of some of the actions undertaken
in 1997–1998. Finally, section 5 presents our main conclusions.
1. For a review of the period at different stages and from different points of
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1. GROWTH ACCOUNTING: EXPLAINING GDP TRENDS
Chile’s favorable growth record in 1985–1997 has attracted the at-
tention of researchers and policymakers interested in learning from
the successful transformation of a Latin American country. The Chil-
ean model is relevant beyond Latin America as it provides a clear con-
trast with the East Asian model, by relying on a private market economy
guided more by rules than by discretion. Consequently, the country
requires a smaller government than the East Asian model, and it there-
fore economizes on human capital and government capacity. The model
might thus be more suitable for the typical developing country. Given
that Chile is rich in natural resources, however, it is natural to ques-
tion whether the success is due to the results of the economic policy
implemented or whether it is only a consequence of a period of good
luck in the commodity lottery.2
To answer this question, we study the factors contributing to the
Chilean growth record in this period. Much work has been done in this
field in recent years, extending the standard Solow model of the 1950s.
It is mostly of the cross-sectional variety and is based on the now fairly
standard new growth theory framework (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995;
Fischer, 1993). Within this framework, a sudden jump in the growth
rate, such as that observed in 1985–1997 in Chile, has to be attributed
to a change in the growth rate of capital accumulation, a temporal
increase in the growth rate of employment above the growth rate of the
labor force, a jump in the growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP),
or a combination of these three factors. Of course, the rate of increase
in capital accumulation can be affected by changes in the prices of
export commodities.
Lefort and Solimano (1994) and Meller, O’Ryan, and Solimano (1996)
use this type of framework for the case of Chile. The latter paper shows
that in the prereform period (1951–1973 in the study), TFP growth was
small relative to GDP growth, while in 1984–1989 (which the authors
define as a period of recovery and reconsolidation of reforms), TFP growth
was 0.79 percent per year, and growth in the labor input was the main
factor contributing to growth. In contrast, in 1989–1993 (here defined
as a period of sustained growth), the growth of TFP was 2.39 percent
per year and accounted for one-third of the GDP growth rate. The con-
tribution of capital accumulation alone in this period was close to one-
half of the GDP growth rate—3.5 percent compared with 7.1 percent.
2. Bulmer-Thomas (1994).469 Growth and Adjustment in Chile:  A Look at the 1990s
Lefort and Solimano (1994) follow the work of Fischer (1993) in
endogenizing the growth rate of factor inputs and TFP. They relate the
growth rate of these variables to macroeconomic factors, economic re-
forms, and external shocks. They find that macroeconomic instability,
measured by the inflation rate and the standard deviation of the infla-
tion rate, has a negative effect on the growth rate of factor inputs and the
rate of change of TFP.3 They also find that the volatility of the real
exchange rate, measured by its standard deviation, has a negative effect
on the rate of change of TFP, whereas trade liberalization and financial
deepening have a positive effect on the rate of change of TFP. Indeed,
financial deepening “is the most important factor in explaining the change
in total factor productivity growth, both in the whole sample and in the
period 1974–1989” (Lefort and Solimano, 1994, p. 25).
The same study finds that rate of change in the terms of trade
has a positive effect on the rate of capital accumulation for the period
1974–1989. After testing the robustness of their findings, the authors
conclude that macroeconomic factors and TFP growth chiefly affect
capital formation.
To further examine the factors accounting for Chile’s growth record,
we re-estimate Lefort and Solimano’s extended production function
framework, extending the sample up to 1997. We then use the esti-
mated equation to compute the factors contributing to growth in six
subperiods (1951–1960, 1961–1970, 1971–1980, 1981–1985, 1986–1995,
and 1995–1997). Table 2 reports the results. We find that the accel-
eration of growth during the high growth periods, 1986–1995 and
1995–1997, is largely due to a quantum jump in the growth rate of
Table 2. Factors Accounting for Growth
Period Labor Capital TFP Total
1951-1960 0.99 1.33 0.64 2.96
1961-1970 0.74 1.61 1.39 3.74
1971-1980 0.40 0.79 0.09 1.28
1981-1985 0.74 0.50 -2.95 -1.71
1986-1995 0.87 1.56 3.97 6.4
1995-1997 0.69 4.80 3.01 8.5
Source: Authors’ own calculations.
3. Lefort and Solimano (1994) also find that the response of the rate of change
of factor inputs and of TFP to inflation is nonlinear, with a higher response to high
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total factor productivity, which alone accounts for more than half of
the GDP growth rate, on average. This result is higher than that
reported by Meller, O’Ryan, and Solimano (1996) just for the period
1989–1993. The second most important factor is capital accumula-
tion, which contributes more than 40 percent of the total.
This raises the question of the extent to which the growth reported
above really reflects sustained growth, rather than recovery. There is
no way to answer this question short of developing a full general equi-
librium model for the period. One point is clear, however. As the economy
was approaching full employment toward the end of 1997, sustaining
the growth process would have required maintaining a high growth
rate of capital formation; continuing to improve the allocation of re-
sources and the incentives for firms to increase efficiency; and increas-
ing the contribution of human capital accumulation. Instead, Chile
suffered another string of external shocks and some important slip-
pages in economic policy: a string of large increases in the minimum
wage starting in May 1998, an expansionary fiscal policy just when the
current account deficit had to be reduced, and a hard monetary policy
response to exchange rate pressure. This combination of factors de-
railed the economy from its previous high growth path.
2. MACROECONOMIC POLICIES AND DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
1990S: AN OVERVIEW
By the end of the 1980s, the transition to a democratically elected
government was in process, and the Chilean economy was enjoying a
solid economic performance backed by strong macroeconomic fundamen-
tals and sound microeconomic policies that promoted integration into
the world economy and competition. On the macroeconomic side, the
public sector debt was manageable, there was a fiscal surplus, and mon-
etary policy was geared toward avoiding an acceleration of inflation
and—with the help of the fiscal surplus—maintaining a competitive real
exchange rate. In 1989, growth was 10.6 percent, the unemployment
rate was 7.1 percent (down from 12 percent in 1985), inflation reached
21.4 percent, and the current account deficit was 2.5 percent of GDP.4
The new coalition government that took power in March 1990 made
a strategic decision to embrace the market-oriented, open-economy poli-
cies of the past administration. Early on, the government implemented a
stabilization program to slow down an economy that was clearly over-
4. For a description of monetary policy in this period see Fontaine (1991).471 Growth and Adjustment in Chile:  A Look at the 1990s
heating by the late 1980s, with accelerating inflation. The recently in-
stalled Board of the Central Bank had the responsibility of bringing in-
flation under control. The newly independent Central Bank was created
in October 1989 and began operating in December 1989, only three months
before the Presidency was transferred from Pinochet to Aylwin. It un-
dertook as its main task the gradual reduction of inflation. The focus on
gradualism was based on the concern that a rapid reduction of inflation
would introduce serious distortions in relative prices in an economy char-
acterized by widespread indexation of key prices to past inflation. Al-
though the Central Bank’s main objectives are to achieve price stability
and to ensure the proper functioning of the domestic and external pay-
ment systems, the existence of a robust financial system and solid exter-
nal accounts allowed the Central Bank to focus on the inflation rate
objective. In terms of the current literature on central bank indepen-
dence, the Central Bank of Chile is modeled on Rogoff’s conservative
central banker (1985)5. Chilean law gives the Central Bank indepen-
dence to set its own targets, as well as to choose the instruments it
deems appropriate for achieving those targets6. In contrast to other inde-
pendent Central Banks created recently, the Central Bank of Chile is
also responsible for the exchange rate system and for exchange rate policy.
The Central Bank initially set itself the objective of gradually reduc-
ing inflation. That objective was later modified to achieving inflation
rates similar to those observed in industrial countries, while maintain-
ing current account deficits that would not jeopardize the stability of the
external payment system7. Whenever the two objectives entered into
conflict, as was the case in 1996, the inflation target was given priority.
The inflation objective for the coming year is chosen by the Central
Bank and then announced to the Congress and the country during the
first fifteen days of September of each year. At first, that objective was
5. In this model, the Central Bank Board behaves as if minimizing a quadratic
loss function. The arguments of the function are the departure of the inflation rate
from its target and the departure of the current account deficit from its target (or the
unemployment rate from its target in Rogoff’s model). De facto, the Central Bank has
been assigning the greatest weight to the inflation term, resulting in conduct similar
to that observed for what Rogoff describes ad the conservative central banker.
6. This is by omission more than by commission, since the Central Bank’s charter
spells out its objective of achieving price stability but does not specify who sets the
inflation target.
7. Massad (1998) defines this level as 4 percent of GDP when the current
account is measured using normal terms-of-trade levels. Unfortunately, normal is
not defined in the same paper. Morandé (2001b) states that the current account
objective was 2 to 4 percent up to 1995 and between 4 percent and 5 percent
between 1996 and 1998.472 Vittorio Corbo and José A. Tessada
8. For reviews and descriptions of monetary policy in this period- see Corbo
and Fischer (1994); Corbo (1998); Budnevich and Pérez (1995); Massad (1998);
Zahler (1998). A review of the international experience with inflation targeting in
the same period can be found in Bernanke and others (1999).
9. The discount was estimated to be a 2 percent annual appreciation, based on
a Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect. More recent estimations obtain values of 0.7
percent (see Délano and Valdés, 1998).
stated in terms of a range for the consumer price index (CPI) inflation
rate for the period December to December of the coming year. In Septem-
ber 1994, the Central Bank moved toward setting a point estimate for
the inflation objective. Finally, in September 1999, it announced that
the objective was now to maintain an inflation rate in the range of 2
percent to 4 percent, allowing only for temporary deviations from these
bounds. At the same time, the Bank replaced the exchange rate band
system with a floating rate. In the initial years, the target was announced
without an explicit declaration of how policy was going to be conducted.
The system has since converged to a full-fledged inflation-targeting re-
gime. The inflation target is the ultimate objective of policy, while a
publicly announced inflation forecast is the intermediate objective; the
interest rate is the main instrument for achieving those objectives.8
When the independent Central Bank started to operate in late 1989, it
inherited a passive crawling peg exchange rate band system that had been
in operation since the mid-1980s. In that system, the mean point of the
band was adjusted by the differential between domestic and foreign infla-
tion in a sort of constant central parity for the real exchange rate. The
width of the band at the time was 5 percent in each direction of the central
parity. As the Central Bank pursued its objective of achieving a target
inflation rate, the secondary objective of also targeting a level for the real
exchange rate became increasingly problematic, given that the combina-
tion of favorable external factors and perceived good domestic policies in
Chile resulted in a quantum jump in capital inflows. Consequently, a
conflict between the inflation target and the real exchange rate objective
surfaced repeatedly in the 1990s. The inflation objective was given prior-
ity, but the Central Bank also struggled to avoid an excessive real appre-
ciation. Throughout most of this period, it actively intervened in the for-
eign exchange rate market, implementing an aggressive and costly policy
of foreign reserve accumulation, accompanied by the sterilization of the
monetary effects of this accumulation. At other times, the Bank accom-
modated a real appreciation with a downward adjustment of the central
parity and reduced the slope of the central parity by introducing a dis-
count related to the growth rate of productivity9. It was during this period473 Growth and Adjustment in Chile:  A Look at the 1990s
10. The exchange rate system took the form of a diagonal exchange rate band
throughout most of the 1990s. The central parity of the band was adjusted pas-
sively, on a daily basis, by the difference between the domestic and international
inflation. The width of the band was increased to 10 percent on both sides of
central parity in January 1992. Central parity was established in terms of the
value of the U.S. dollar before July 1992 and in terms of a basket of currencies
thereafter. Starting in November 1995, a further 2 percent per year was sub-
tracted from the central parity to accommodate an estimate for trend appreciation
of the equilibrium real exchange rate.
of high capital inflows that the Central Bank introduced an unremuner-
ated reserve requirement for capital inflows.
The problem inherent in the simultaneous pursuit of inflation and
exchange rate targets is well known. Within the exchange rate system,
as long as the observed value of the exchange rate is well within the
band, the uncovered interest rate parity condition provides a link be-
tween the interest rate and the exchange rate, such that any adjust-
ment of the domestic interest rate results in a movement of the nomi-
nal exchange rate. For all practical purposes, therefore, exchange rate
policy cannot be independent10. The Central Bank of Chile also ran into
conflicts with the Ministry of Finance whenever an increase in domes-
tic interest rates caused a sharp nominal and real exchange rate ap-
preciation, since such an appreciation could lead to a deterioration in
the profitability of exports and eventually damage the long-term
sustainability of the export-led growth process.
Chile did not suffer the effects of either the tequila crisis itself or its
extension to Argentina, thanks to continuous access to foreign financ-
ing and very favorable terms of trade. The economy was by then deliv-
ering growth above 7 percent per year, the unemployment rate was
falling rapidly, and annual inflation decrease continuously throughout
the period. Public support for the economic policies thus began to in-
crease. Difficulties on the macroeconomic front only began to emerge
in early 1998, when the authorities were unable to articulate a coordi-
nated monetary and fiscal policy response to a series of severe external
shocks. In addition, several speculative attacks on the currency initi-
ated a period of very high interest rates, which ultimately resulted in a
sharp slowdown.
Various factors were behind the slowdown in growth, but one of the
key processes was the deterioration in the external environment, in-
cluding a drop in the terms of trade and reduced financial inflows ow-
ing to contagion from the series of emerging market crises. The terms
of trade fell 15.2 percent between 1997 and 1999. But this was not all.
On the eve of the Asian crisis, 33.1 percent of Chilean exports went to474 Vittorio Corbo and José A. Tessada
Asia; these subsequently dropped by 25 percent. Furthermore, in what
is a major difference with the tequila crisis of late 1994, this time the
deterioration in the external environment came when the economy was
already overheating. Domestic expenditure was growing at an average
four-quarter rate of 14.4 percent during the last two quarters of 1997
and the first of 1998. The spending boom was fueled by a combination
of a private-sector-led spending boom, overgenerous public sector wage
increases, a sharp increase in the minimum wage, and another for-
eign-financed lending boom. In contrast with the crisis of the early
1980s, however, the financial system was quite strong thanks to a well-
designed and effectively enforced supervisory and regulatory system,
as well as the existence of well-capitalized banks. Even so, the over-
heating did take place, and, as a result, the excess of domestic spend-
ing over national disposable income—that is, the current account defi-
cit—reached 7.4 percent of GDP in the year ending in the third quarter
of 1998. The real exchange rate suffered a sharp appreciation, as is
typical of an economy facing increasing demand pressures in the
nontradables market.
The deterioration in the external environment coincided with a
strongly expansionary economic cycle, and it set in motion several specu-
lative attacks on the exchange rate system, this time on the exchange
rate band. Although the explicit exchange rate band was a very wide
12.5 percent on each side of the central parity, and the market exchange
rate was solidly on lower end of the range, the Central Bank was implic-
itly targeting a level of the exchange rate as an additional tool—on top of
the short-term interest rate—to keep inflation within the target and to
avoid an excessive exchange rate appreciation that could contribute to
widening the current account deficit (Morandé, 2001a).
By the time the Asian crisis hit, the Chilean economy was over-
heating behind a foreign-financed boom in private domestic spending
and expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. Indeed, the Central Bank
initiated a series of cuts to reduce the policy interest rate from 7.5
percent to 6.5 percent, starting in February 1997. The latter level was
set in October of the same year. Three arguments might be used to
justify these reductions in the policy rate. First, inflation was coming
down and was well within the target-band; the Central Bank could
thus have been quite confident that future inflation was not a problem.
Second, if the terms-of-trade shock was expected to provide enough re-
straint, authorities may have seen room to introduce a more expan-
sionary policy, given that inflation was under control. Third, the high
costs of sterilization may have led the Central Bank to decide to stop475 Growth and Adjustment in Chile:  A Look at the 1990s
sterilizing the monetary effect of the foreign reserve accumulation. The
Central Bank in fact accumulated more than US$3 billion in foreign
reserves from end-January 1997 to end-October 1997. As shown in
appendix B, fiscal policy was also expansionary during this period. Mea-
sures of quarterly fiscal impulse indicate that fiscal policy was expan-
sionary during almost the whole period between 1997:2 and 1999:2 (see
figure 1). The fiscal impulse for the periods before and after 1997:2
exhibit clear differences. Marcel and others (2001) use annual data to
show that half of the deterioration in the fiscal accounts in 1997–1999
can be accounted for by a more expansionary fiscal policy and the other
half by the cycle and the temporary deterioration in the price of copper.
When the Asian crisis emerged in the third quarter of 1997, domes-
tic expenditure was growing at 12.0 percent and GDP at 8.7 percent
(both as the four-quarter rate of change), while the current account
deficit in the year up to the third quarter of 1997 had reached 4.5 per-
cent of GDP. The deterioration in the external environment and the
resulting reduction in the terms of trade raised the prospects for a
further rise in the current account deficit. Under these circumstances,
the appropriate response was a monetary and fiscal policy mix capable
Figure 1. Quarterly Fiscal Impulse
Source: Authors’ calculations.476 Vittorio Corbo and José A. Tessada
of providing appropriate restraint while facilitating the real deprecia-
tion required for switching. Given that the exchange rate was already
in the lower range of the exchange rate band, the correct mix here was
a restrictive fiscal policy and a monetary policy geared toward assist-
ing a nominal and real depreciation of the currency. The budget sub-
mitted to and approved by Congress, however, was extremely expan-
sionary, as it was built under the assumption of a 7 percent growth
rate in 1998. Moreover, some additional fiscal decisions that did not
directly affect the budget might have had a perverse effect on the evolu-
tion of private sector expenditure and wage arrangements. The mini-
mum wage was raised more than 40 percent in May 1998—many
months after the Asian crisis had emerged—and public sector wages
were raised 6 percent in 1998. The sharp minimum wage adjustment,
together with the generous increase in public sector wages in the same
year, gave a bad signal to private sector workers and made switching
more difficult and costly in terms of unemployment. A more conserva-
tive budget and lower wage adjustments might have helped to adjust
domestic demand without having to rely exclusively on monetary policy.
As it was, monetary policy was confronted with an important trade-off
between the inflation target and deteriorated real activity given the
deterioration of the external environment.
The first episode of an attack on the peso coincides with the develop-
ment of the Asian Crisis, when the sharp increases in domestic interest
rates all across Asia and the massive capital flight that was developing
resulted in a major downfall in regional stock markets, including Latin
America. Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico experienced record falls on Mon-
day, 27 October. Later that week, severe pressure started to build on the
Latin American currencies and stock markets, especially in Brazil, Ar-
gentina, and Mexico. By early 1998, as the plunge in the Asian curren-
cies intensified and Indonesia’s political problems increased, the conta-
gion to Latin America accelerated through Brazil and Argentina. The
observed value of the Chilean market exchange rate at this time was
well within the lower half (the most appreciated part) of the band. The
Central Bank was in a difficult position, however, with an expansionary
fiscal policy for the year already approved in Congress and an overheat-
ing economy. It was thus reluctant to allow the exchange rate to depreci-
ate within the band out of a fear that a high pass-through from the
depreciation to inflation would jeopardize the inflation target for the fol-
lowing year11. This fear of depreciation—that is, of letting the exchange
11. Indeed all through this period the market exchange rate was well within
the lower—or most appreciated—part of the band.477 Growth and Adjustment in Chile:  A Look at the 1990s
rate depreciate within the exchange rate band—is clearly stated in a
recent paper by the then Chief Economist of the Central Bank:
At first, in early 1998, the main fear of the Central Bank was that
the rapid depreciation of the peso in progress was a serious threat to
the inflation target set for the year’s end. This concern was based on
the high pass-through from the peso depreciation to domestic infla-
tion when the local demand was growing at annual rates of over 12
percent, estimated then at 0.6 (Morandé, 2001a, p. 4).
The fear of depreciation was also sometimes linked to its potential
balance sheet effects.12 Given this fear of depreciation and despite the
refusal of the fiscal authorities to revise the level of government expendi-
tures for the year 1998, the Central Bank decided to lean against the
wind, first selling foreign reserves and then, beginning in early January
of 1998, increasing the policy interest rate. Between end-November 1997
and end-January 1998, the level of foreign reserves fell by US$2 billion,
equivalent to more than 10 percent of the initial stock. This provides
evidence in favor of the view that the failure to coordinate monetary and
fiscal policy had its share of responsibility in the costly adjustment of the
1997–1998 period. The rise in the policy real interest rate, introduced a
little later, was quite steep, from 6.5 percent in January to 8.5 percent in
February—a full 200 basis points in less than two months. When the
rate was raised another 150 basis points on 3 February 1998, the Cen-
tral Bank also changed its operation procedures, shifting its intermedi-
ate target away from the interest rate and toward a monetary aggregate.
As stated by the Central Bank Board on 3 February:
The administration of liquidity will be oriented toward providing
enough resources for the normal functioning of the financial system,
with the objective that the inter-bank rate, at a minimum, be equal
to the policy or reference interest rate [authors’ translation].
Not surprisingly, as the expectation of a depreciation increased with
the deterioration in the external environment, the market interest rate
became much higher than the policy interest rate, with the latter now
serving as a minimum value for the overnight interest rate. The opera-
tional procedure used for this purpose was the introduction of mon-
etary targets. Restrictions on capital inflows were also progressively
reduced in April 1998.
12. Public Statement of the Central Bank, 23 December 1998.478 Vittorio Corbo and José A. Tessada
The second episode of a speculative attack took place around the
last week of June 1998, when Brazil’s large current account deficit (7.4
percent of GDP in the year ending in the third quarter of 1998) and
contagion from the developing Russian crisis put renewed pressure on
the Brazilian exchange rate system. The country’s looming budget and
current account deficits and upcoming presidential elections made Brazil
the center of the attack.13 When the contagion from the attack on the
Brazilian currency reached Chile, the Central Bank used a battery of
instruments to withstand the attack. A set of measures was announced
on 25 June. First, the reserve requirement on capital inflows was re-
duced from 30 percent to 10 percent. Second, dollar-indexed Central
Bank bonds were offered to facilitate private sector coverage of exchange
rate risks and to relieve the pressure on the spot foreign exchange
market. Third, in a move that took everybody by surprise, the Central
Bank narrowed the exchange rate band from 12.5 percent on both sides
of a central parity to an asymmetric band with a 3.5 percent lower
band and a 2 percent upper band. The Central Bank statement at the
time justified the move as a way of reducing the volatility in foreign
exchange and financial markets. Because the market interest rate was
the main instrument used to defend the narrow band, domestic inter-
est rates increased substantially, reaching monthly levels of close to
4.5 percent in real terms. The deterioration of the situation in Russia
and the continuous pressure on the Brazilian currency made the move
to reduce the width of the band a very costly undertaking, in that the
high interest rates required to defend the narrower band had detrimen-
tal effects on sectors sensitive to a sharp increase in interest rates.
A third attack on the peso developed after the Russian crisis of Au-
gust 1998 and continued through mid-September, when the pressure on
the Brazilian real was gaining renewed force. By then, however, the very
high interest rates of the previous months were taking their toll on do-
mestic spending, which was contracting sharply and thereby helping
achieve a sharp reduction in the current account deficit. The four-quar-
ter rate of change of domestic expenditures fell from 18.1 percent in the
13. The logic of this attack on the Brazilian currency can be derived from a
second-generation model of currency crisis (Obstfeld, 1996; Krugman, 1996). In
this model, private agents anticipate that the government faces a clear trade-off
between the benefits of holding the exchange rate fixed (the exchange rate was
by then the key anchor for inflation) and the costs associated with defending it
through high interest rates with elections approaching in October 1998. Although
the Brazilian Central Bank decided to fight the attack with high interest rates,
this defense probably was not credible given the upcoming elections and the al-
ready weak public finances.479 Growth and Adjustment in Chile:  A Look at the 1990s
14. Also on 3 September, the period considered for the computation of mini-
mum reserve requirements was reduced from thirty to fifteen days to reduce the
opportunities for banks to speculate against the peso.
Figure 2. GDP and Domestic Expenditure Growth
Source: Authors’ calculations. Seasonally adjusted using X-12 ARIMA.
first quarter of 1998 to 9.2 percent in the second quarter, 2.8 percent in
the third quarter, and –11.6 percent in the fourth quarter.
Following this attack, the Central Bank decided to raise the policy
interest rate and make it binding again by providing enough liquidity
to an economy that was slowing down very fast.14 Thus, the policy
interest rate, which had not been relevant for the determination of the
interest rate since January, was raised to 14 percent on 16 September,
bringing up the market rate along with it. At the same time, the Cen-
tral Bank announced that the exchange rate band was going to con-
verge by the end of the year to a wider, symmetric band of ±5 percent
around a central parity. These changes helped ease the pressure on the
exchange rate, and the nominal exchange rate effectively remained close
to the middle of the band for the rest of the year.
Table 3 presents the quarterly evolution of the main macroeconomic























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.481 Growth and Adjustment in Chile:  A Look at the 1990s
for the main macroeconomic variables with respect to their values in
the second quarter of 1998; and figure 2 presents the seasonally ad-
justed levels of GDP and domestic expenditure. The tables and figure
illustrate that after peaking in early 1998, GDP and domestic spending
(private consumption, public consumption, and total investment) started
to fall rapidly.
Identifying the possible sources of this slowdown is not an easy
task, since many factors were present at the same time. A primary
Table 4. Cumulative Changes in Selected Macroeconomic
Aggregates
Panel (a): Changes from 1998.IIa
Percent
1998.IV 1999.I 1999.II 1999.III 1999.IV
Gross Domestic Product -3.9 -4.0 -3.6 -2.6 -0.3
Absorption -10.3 -12.6 -14.2 -12.1 -10.1
Total Consumption -9.8 -11.1 -12.2 -7.9 -4.5
Fixed Investment -11.8 -16.3 -19.2 -22.5 -24.0
Net Exports 54.9 69.6 83.4 77.5 80.8
Exports 0.6 2.6 6.4 5.4 10.1
Imports -15.1 -17.8 -19.0 -18.0 -15.7
Panel (b): Changes from 1998.II
1998.IV 1999.I 1999.II 1999.III 1999.IV
Difference (percentage points)
Unemployment Rate 0.30 2.00 3.10 4.70 4.80
Core Inflationb 0.187 0.44 -0.169 -1.286 -2.382
Real Interest Rate 4.18 0.63 -1.13 -2.23 -3.25
Capital Flows ( GDP)c 10.07 7.75 -4.52 1.63 4.05
Capital Flows ( GDP)d -1.45 -0.18 -2.84 -2.39 -3.95
Change (%)
Real Money M1A -5.8 -9.5 -8.3 -5.1 -1.4
Real Money M2 3.0 2.6 1.5 5.7 8.1
Terms of Trade -2.7 -5.7 -8.7 -8.5 -5.2
Employment 0.1 -1.2 -2.4 -3.7 -3.4
a. Seasonally adjusted data
b. 4-quarter change
c. Quarter
d. 4-quarter moving average
Source: Authors’ own calculation on base of Central Bank of Chile (2001) and Economic and Financial Report,
various issues.482 Vittorio Corbo and José A. Tessada
exploration can be achieved by computing the differences between the
actual values of each component of GDP and values simulated under
the alternative scenario of each component growing at the average GDP
growth rate of the previous fourteen years. The results of this analysis
are shown in table 5, which reports the values as a percentage of the
GDP value obtained under the assumption that all variables grew at
the previously observed average growth. As can be observed, the major
decelerations came from private consumption and fixed investment.15
Carrying out the same decomposition using quarterly data allows
us to take a closer look at the factors behind the slowdown. Unfortu-
nately, Chilean quarterly national accounts provide a demand decom-
position with only four terms: total consumption (private and public
consumption plus change in inventories); fixed investment; imports of
goods and nonfactor services; and exports of goods and nonfactor ser-
vices. Despite the loss of detail in the disaggregation, working with
quarterly data has a big advantage in that the possible break point can
be observed more closely.16 We use the first quarter of 1998 as our
break point, as it represents the peak in the level of domestic spending
and thus allows us to capture possible differences among variables in
the timing of the slowdown. The benchmark scenario is one in which
each component grows at a rate equal to the average quarter-to-quar-
ter growth rate of GDP during the previous fourteen years. In line with
the previous results, the major deceleration during 1998 came from
total consumption and fixed investment. The slowdown of real imports
was also very severe, but in our analysis this means a positive contri-
bution to GDP growth (see table 6).
Table 5. Decomposition of the Economic Slowdown:
Annual Values
Percent
Government Private Inventory Fixed
consumption consumption investment investment Exports Imports GDP
1998 0.07 -2.40 -1.15 -2.71 -1.62 4.25 -3.57
1999 0.03 -9.34 -5.59 -11.65 -2.94 17.91 -11.57
2000 0.07 -11.55 -4.34 -14.19 -4.08 20.50 -13.59
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on the methodology of Hall (1993).
15. The import figure is positive because from an accounting perspective, a
lower imports value implies a higher GDP value.
16. We use seasonally adjusted data.483 Growth and Adjustment in Chile:  A Look at the 1990s
This analysis does not allow us to separate the deceleration between
exogenous innovations in the variable and changes caused by endog-
enous responses to shocks in other variables. To recognize the causes of
the slowdown it is necessary to take a closer look at those exogenous
innovations. As an approximation of these effects, we follow the analysis
that Blanchard (1993) uses to identify shocks to GDP components dur-
ing the 1990–1991 recession in the United States.17 We estimate a quar-
terly VAR model including three components of GDP: total consumption,
fixed investment, and net exports.18 The first two variables are expressed
as four-quarter rate of change and the third as percentage of trend GDP,
which is measured as an exponential trend of seasonally adjusted GDP.
An additional variable—the four-quarter rate of change of GDP—was
included in the exercise, but its lags were not included as explanatory
variables; this step is made just to obtain its forecast errors19.
To identify the structural shocks, we again follow Blanchard (1993) in
assuming that every variable is affected only by its structural shock and
by the current GDP structural shock. GDP is assumed to be independent,
so it is not affected by the other shocks.20 To compute the effect of the GDP




GDP consumption investment exports Exports Imports
Mar-98 -1.09 -0.90 -0.08 -0.11 -1.78 1.68
Jun-98 -2.68 -4.87 -1.16 3.35 -1.11 4.46
Sep-98 -4.71 -7.63 -3.12 6.04 -1.76 7.81
Dic-98 -9.61 -15.41 -6.02 11.81 -2.35 14.16
Mar-99 -11.69 -17.79 -7.92 14.02 -2.31 16.33
Jun-99 -13.10 -19.83 -9.29 16.02 -1.67 17.69
Sep-99 -13.43 -17.98 -10.70 15.25 -2.73 17.99
Dic-99 -12.66 -16.83 -11.59 15.76 -1.86 17.62
Mar-00 -13.95 -17.21 -10.93 14.19 -1.63 15.82
Jun-00 -14.70 -15.94 -10.75 11.98 -3.07 15.05
Sep-00 -15.25 -19.95 -10.80 15.49 -2.14 17.63
Dic-00 -15.69 -20.45 -10.71 15.47 -2.66 18.13
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on the methodology of Hall (1993).
17. Walsh (1993) carries out an alternative and more elaborated analysis.
18. Total consumption is the sum of private consumption, inventory invest-
ment, and government consumption.
19. For a more detailed explanation of this methodology, see Blanchard (1993).
20. This implies that the forecast error is exactly the structural shock.484 Vittorio Corbo and José A. Tessada
structural error on the rest of the variables, we estimate three equations,
one for each forecasting error, with the GDP shock included as an ex-
planatory variable. These regressions are estimated using two-stage least
squares (TSLS); the instruments used are the GDP growth of the main
trade partners, the change in the U.S. dollar London interbank offer rate
(LIBOR), and the rate of change in the terms of trade.21 The structural
errors are reported in table 7.
The picture presented in the table is not as clear as we would like.
Fixed investment suffered a severe negative shock in the second half of
1999, but before that there is no evidence of changes not forecast by the
lagged structure of the VAR model. GDP suffered a large negative shock
the first quarter of 1998, but this was offset by a large positive one in
the fourth quarter.
What is important to note is the presence of two large positive shocks
to the foreign demand component in the last two quarters of 1998, per-
haps reflecting the good external environment provided by a sound U.S.
economy. So, apart from some large and specific shocks, the evolution
of GDP is almost entirely explained by the internal dynamic of the
economy implied in the model. Total consumption has just one signifi-




GDP consumption investment exports
1997.IV -0.655 0.509 0.547 -1.321
1998.I -1.167 0.120 -0.702 0.161
1998.II 0.762 -1.103 0.561 0.019
1998.III -0.583 -0.413 -0.471 1.494
1998.IV 1.212 -0.932 0.015 1.403
1999.I 0.630 -0.707 0.097 0.531
1999.II -0.268 1.383 -0.575 -0.285
1999.III -1.008 0.828 -1.570 0.325
1999.IV -0.542 -0.369 -0.477 0.404
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. Shocks are normally distributed with mean 0 and standard deviation 1.
21. We use different sets of instruments, and the results are robust to these
changes. The results also hold when the estimation is carried out using ordinary
least squares (OLS) instead of TSLS.485 Growth and Adjustment in Chile:  A Look at the 1990s
cant shock, but after the second quarter of 1998, it suffered four con-
secutive negative shocks that may have pushed its significant decel-
eration. The puzzling result is the important positive effect of the ex-
ternal demand component.
3. SOURCES OF THE ECONOMIC SLOWDOWN: RESULTS FROM
A NONSTRUCTURAL VAR MODEL
A further step toward understanding the post-1997 slowdown in-
volves the use of a nonstructural VAR model. We estimate a
nonstructural VAR including six endogenous and two exogenous vari-
ables.22 The endogenous variables are the interest rate of the PRBC-90,
the gap between core inflation rate and the linearized target inflation
rate, the twelve-month rate of change of nominal money (M1A), the
twelve-month rate of change of the real exchange rate, a monthly mea-
sure of the current account (as a percent of GDP), and the twelve-
month rate of change of a monthly activity index (IMACEC).23 The two
exogenous variables are lags of the logarithm of the terms of trade and
lags of the external inflation (expressed as a twelve-month rate of
change).24 We also estimate a VAR including the twelve-month rate of
change of the monthly aggregate expenditure (AGEXP) instead of over-
all economic activity among the endogenous variables (IMACEC).25 The
variables included here are frequently used in VAR analyses of mon-
etary policy in Chile.
We use these nonstructural VARs to simulate alternative scenarios
starting from two different break points: September 1997 and June
1998. For the first period, we estimate the VAR up to September 1997
and then simulate it forward using the observed values of the exog-
enous variables. These simulated values are used as a benchmark for
comparisons with simulations that use alternative scenarios for the
22. For a review of the VAR methodology, see Hamilton (1994); Greene (2000);
Stock and Watson (2001). For references on VAR estimation for Chile with sur-
veys of related work, see Valdés (1997); García (2000); Cabrera and Lagos (2000).
Our estimations closely follow the structure used by Valdés (1997).
23. The PRBC-90 corresponds to the rate of the Central Bank’s ninety-day
indexed bonds. The lags were selected according to the Akaike info criteria. All the
individual equations presented a good fit of the data, with R-squared statistics
higher than 0.8 in almost every case.
24. The monthly terms of trade were obtained from Bennett and Valdés
(2001). They also compute a different measure of the monthly terms of trade; our
results do not change significantly when we employ this alternative.
25. The authors compute monthly aggregate expenditure.486 Vittorio Corbo and José A. Tessada
exogenous variables. The results of the dynamic simulation are very
interesting. Comparing the observed values of the IMACEC with the
dynamic forecasts, we observe no great differences up to April 1998.
This is not the case for AGEXP. When aggregate expenditure is used,
the dynamic forecasts are not very good; in fact, the strong accelera-
tion of its growth observed during the first months of 1998 is not ex-
plained by the VAR (see figure 3).
After the third quarter of 1997, the current account steadily de-
creased during the simulated period. This major deficit is almost en-
tirely captured by the dynamic simulations, especially when the aggre-
gate expenditure is added.
In the case of the real interest rate, the results are qualitatively
similar to the AGEXP results. The dynamic forecasts are very different
from the actual values, and the difference is important from January
1998 up to the last point of the simulation. The divergence coincides
with an episode of strong pressure on the Chilean peso and a sharp
increase in the overnight interest rate in mid-January. After the pres-
sure on the currency was reduced as a result of the very high overnight
and short-term interest rates, the Central Bank reacted by officially
changing the interpretation of the policy interest rate from a guide for
the overnight interest rate to a floor for the same rate. The policy rate
was raised at the same time. The policy response is not explained by
the dynamic forecasting errors of domestic spending (AGEXP) or of the
current account; an alternative simulation using the observed values
of both variables does not eliminate the difference.26 According to this
preliminary evidence, then, monetary policy exhibited a different reac-
tion, understanding as normal what is implied by the VAR equation.27
We cannot extract strong inference because the model is very simple,
but the simulations give us an insight into possible explanations for
the slowdown. The justification for this “different” monetary policy re-
action is another question entirely, which we address later in the paper
by introducing a series of different considerations.
Next we simulate the effect of alternative external environments
on the endogenous variables listed above. The alternative scenarios take
26. Corbo (2002) shows that the current account deficit was effectively an-
other target variable for monetary policy during the 1990s in Chile. This view is
also supported in the empirical results reported in section 4 below.
27. This raises the question of whether the correspondent equation of the
VAR is a good estimator of the policy reaction function. If we assume that mon-
etary policy is forward-looking, the equation implies that the right-hand variables
include the entire set of information available to the policymakers and that the
estimation method gives us consistent estimators.Figure 3. Actual and Dynamic Forecasts, VAR Model,
October 1997-June 1998
Source: Authors’ calculations.488 Vittorio Corbo and José A. Tessada
into account different elements of the impact of the change in the exter-
nal environment on the Chilean economy. The alternative scenarios
are simulated from October 1997 up to June 1998, such that period of
simulation includes the sudden stop of capital inflows after the third
quarter of 1997, the first speculative attack on the peso in January
1998, and the aggregate expenditure and current account boom of the
first months of 1998.
There are four alternative scenarios. The first scenario fixes the
terms of trade at their September 1997 value and uses the observed
values of the other exogenous variable; the solution for the current
account balance is obtained from the model.28 The second examines the
external financing shock by fixing the value of the current account
balance at its September 1997 value and using the actual values again
for the exogenous variables. The third combines the two previously
described scenarios, that is, it fixes both the terms of trade and the
current account at their September 1997 values. Finally, the fourth
scenario takes the observed values of the current account instead of the
estimated equation of the VAR, that is, we force the adjustment in the
current account that actually took place.29
As shown in figure 4 to 7, the results from the alternative scenarios
are quite robust. In the case of IMACEC, this variable is closely tracked
by each of the simulations, especially for the period up to February
1998. In the case of aggregate expenditure and the market real interest
rate, the simulated values deviate substantially from the actual val-
ues, with the actual values well above those obtained from the dynamic
solution of the model in all the scenarios studied. We conclude that
there was an overexpansion of domestic expenditure that is not ex-
plained by our historical structure. As stated above, the increase in the
real interest rate that began in January 1998 is also not explained,
even if we take into account the actual values of the current account
and the aggregate expenditure growth.30
How do we interpret these findings? Generalized volatility on the
emerging markets might be one possible answer. Interpreting the ap-
parent overshooting in aggregate expenditure is more difficult, as by
28. This scenario is equivalent to eliminating all the endogenous variables’
shocks.
29. These scenarios were simulated using the VAR including the IMACEC
and the VAR including the aggregate expenditure, so that we could check the
robustness of the results.
30. Massad (1998) recognizes that the current account deficit was another
objective for the Central Bank.Figure 4. Actual and Scenario 1, VAR Model,
October 1997-June 1998
Source: Authors’ calculations.Figure 5. Actual Values and Scenario 2, VAR Model,
October 1997-June 1998
Source: Authors’ calculations.Figure 6. Actual Values and Scenario 3, VAR Model,
October 1997-June 1998
Source: Authors’ calculations.Figure 7. Actual Values and Scenario 4, VAR Model,
October 1997-June 1998
Source: Authors’ calculations.493 Growth and Adjustment in Chile:  A Look at the 1990s
that time there were already clear signals of a major deceleration of
world activity. An expansionary fiscal policy may be the missing piece
of the puzzle.31
We conduct a second set of simulations to analyze the effects of the
post-July 1998 shock that followed the Russian and Brazilian crises.
For this purpose, we estimate the VAR model up to June 1998 and
simulate it forward through March 1999. This time interval is even
more interesting than the previous one because it includes the second
episode of severe exchange rate pressure (August and September 1998).
During this period, the overnight interest rate rose as high as 63 per-
cent (expressed as an annual nominal rate), and the exchange rate
target zone was narrowed to provide a signal that the Central Bank
was not going to allow a sharp depreciation of the currency at a time
when the pressure on the peso was intensifying. After solving the model
forward to derive a benchmark solution, we simulate two alternative
scenarios.32 The first replaces the equation of the real interest rate in
the VAR model by the observed real interest rate (scenario 5). That is,
we take the observed real interest rate as exogenous in order to analyze
whether the decline in real activity in the following months can be
explained by monetary policy.33 The second scenario (scenario 6) fixes
the value of the real interest rate at its June 1998 level. That is, it
turns off any response of monetary policy, thereby eliminating both the
endogenous monetary policy response and the “exogenous” monetary
policy shock. It must be noted that both scenarios include the observed
values of the exogenous variables to control for any additional external
shock that may have occurred during the simulation period.
The results for this second period are quite interesting. With re-
gard to the real interest rate, the more interesting evidence derives
from the comparison of the observed values and the values obtained
from the dynamic solution (figure 8). The difference is very clear: nei-
ther the September hike nor the posterior reductions are similar to the
dynamic derived from the historical values. The difference observed
during the first months of 1999 could be explained as the endogenous
31. A more detailed analysis of the fiscal stance during the period is presented
in appendix B.
32. Both alternative scenarios are very similar to the ones included in
Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson (1997).
33. Here we include the endogenous response to the other shocks, as well as
any possible monetary policy shocks. The benchmark case of the dynamic simula-
tion includes only the endogenous response of the real interest rate to the rest of
the variables of the economy. Since all the shocks are ignored, there is no endog-
enous response to exogenous shocks on the other variables.494 Vittorio Corbo and José A. Tessada
response of monetary policy to a deteriorated real activity resulting
from the very high interest rate of the previous months.34 A consider-
ation similar to the one identified for the first simulation period ap-
plies here. Analyzing the policy response in terms of its compatibility
with the previous behavior is not necessarily equal to analyzing it in
terms of rationality or optimality. Also, new information that arrived
during this period is not included in the simulations, and so we can-
not control for them.
We now turn to the results generated when the overall economic
activity index (IMACEC) is replaced by the aggregate expenditure in-
dex (AGEXP). The dynamic solution shows a smooth and steady decel-
eration, but it does not exhibit negative growth rates. The results are
completely different, however, if we look at the simulation obtained
when the observed values of the real interest rate are used. The expen-
diture index shows an abrupt slowdown, slightly smoother than the
observed trend but with the dynamic continuing through February-
March 1999.35 One can interpret this result as evidence that the poste-
rior slowdown was the result of monetary policy actions, both at the
beginning of the simulation period and during the months immediately
preceding it. When the IMACEC is used as the economic activity vari-
able instead of domestic expenditure (AGEXP), the results are qualita-
tively similar. There is one problem, however: the point forecast for
December 1998 is abnormally high owing to the lagged structure of the
real interest rate variable in the equation for the IMACEC. If we ignore
the effect of this month, the simulated values are somewhat lower than
the actual ones, although they are significantly closer than the values
obtained either with the dynamic simulation or under the alternative
scenario with the real interest rate fixed at its June 1998 level. The
picture here is almost exactly the same as that derived from the above
analysis for the expenditure index. Based on this evidence, we can say
that the mayor part of the deceleration of real activity during the pe-
riod can be explained by external factors—mainly terms of trade—and
the high real interest rate path. Results of the simulations of scenarios
5 and 6 are presented in figures 9 and 10.
34. An additional consideration for explaining this reduction can be inferred
from the deceleration of observed and core inflation.
35. When the same scenario is simulated for a longer period, the recovery
implied by the model is faster than the observed recovery. This difference might
be the result of the previously unobserved (in the sample used for the estima-
tions) real interest rate and some type of nonlinear effects of monetary policy on
real activity not captured by the VAR model.Figure 8. Actual and Dynamic Forecasts, VAR Model,
July 1998-March 1999
Source: Authors’ calculations.Figure 9. Actual Values and Scenario 5, VAR Model,
July 1998-March 1999
Source: Authors’ calculations.Figure 10. Actual Values and Scenario 6, VAR Model,
July 1998-March 1999
Source: Authors’ calculations.498 Vittorio Corbo and José A. Tessada
One additional point needs to be addressed. In January 1998 and
again in August-September of the same year, the market real interest
rate (the PRBC-90, which is the same rate used in our estimations) devi-
ated significantly from the policy interest rate (tasa de instancia). Dur-
ing both periods, the policy rate was raised after the market rate reached
its peak. This is related to a change in policy. Before January 1998, the
tasa de instancia was closely related to the overnight rate and the real
market interest rate (the PRBC-90 rate), as monetary policy was geared
toward providing enough liquidity to move the overnight rate toward the
policy rate. When the currency was attacked in January 1998, however,
the Central Bank abstained from providing enough liquidity to keep market
rates close to the policy rate. Market rates were thus left to adjust on
their own in order to defend the currency. The disconnection between the
market rates and the policy rate without any previous warning repre-
sents an important change in the interpretation of monetary policy, which
could have had important effects on balance sheets and private behavior.
After the meeting of the Central Bank’s Board on 3 February 1998, the
policy rate was increased and its interpretation was officially changed to
a floor rate for the overnight interbank rate. To analyze the importance
of this change, we carry out an experiment in which we retain the rela-
tion between the market rate (PRBC-90) and the policy rate that existed
before September 1997—that is, we assume that the conduct of mon-
etary policy had not changed. We first estimate a linear relationship
between the policy rate and the market rate.36 The estimated equation is
then used to obtain forecasts of the market rate for the period from Octo-
ber 1997 to December 1998 (see figure 11). In January and July-Septem-
ber 1998, the observed values of the market rate (the PRBC-90 rate) lie
outside of the band of plus or minus two standard errors. The implica-
tions for the two periods are quite different, however. In January, the
change was abrupt. The sharp increase in market rates most likely took
economic agents by surprise and thus resulted in important losses for
those that were indebted in local currency at market rates. On the other
hand, the Central Bank’s actions to defend the currency against the
attack protected economic agents that were short in dollars from a capi-
tal loss37. In July 1998, the market real interest rate (the PRBC-90)
36. The estimation was carried out using monthly data from June 1995 up to
September 1997. The equation used in the simulation is as follows (R2 = 0.87):
Market Ratet = 1.41 + 0.80*Policy Ratet + 0.41*(Market Rate – Policy Rate)t–1.
37. Indeed, a statement by the Central Bank on 22 December clearly recog-
nizes that in 1998 the Board of the Central Bank was concerned with the balance
sheet effects of a sudden and abrupt depreciation of the peso.499 Growth and Adjustment in Chile:  A Look at the 1990s
started to rise slowly, following increases in the overnight rate. The dif-
ference reached a maximum by mid-September and disappeared when
the policy rate was raised at the Board’s meeting on 16 September.
The January and September episodes were thus quite different. By
September, the market knew that the market rate could be signifi-
cantly higher than the policy rate. Nobody could have been aware of
that in January, however, because the official interpretation was com-
pletely different. This unannounced change of methodology was not a
minor one. As pointed out by Lefort (2000), the joint existence of a floor
policy rate and a legal ceiling on the lending interest rates (in accor-
dance with Chilean banking law) may leave a fraction of borrowers
unable to obtain financing from the formal market. These were the
high-risk and high-cost-of-intermediation borrowers, including small
and medium-sized enterprises that had reduced access to foreign fi-
nancing and not enough high-quality collateral. Just looking at the
market real interest is misleading because some firms face an unob-
served interest rate that is much higher than the market rate, or are
simply unable to borrow.
Figure 11. PRBC-90 Rate and Forecasts based on Policy Rate
Source: Authors’ calculations.500 Vittorio Corbo and José A. Tessada
Caballero’s (2002) interpretation is related to ours. Apart from the
reduced supply of financial resources stemming from the monetary-
policy-induced credit crunch, the much-reduced access to external mar-
kets forced large enterprises—which were credit worthy in the internal
financial market—to look for internal resources, further worsening the
squeeze on small and medium-sized firms. This means that at least
part of the explanation of the slowdown could have been an adverse
supply shock owing to financial constraints. This shock was exogenous
to borrowers, but its origin can be attributed, at least partially, to mon-
etary policy actions. This effect was probably exacerbated by portfolio
adjustment toward dollar assets in anticipation of an eventual exchange
rate adjustment that was postponed through the high real interest rates.
4. MACROECONOMIC POLICIES IN 1997–1999: EVALUATION
WITH A SMALL STRUCTURAL MODEL
The analysis of the previous two sections generates a number of
questions about the appropriateness of the policy response to the in-
creased pressure over the peso. The Central Bank faced the problem of
fulfilling its main responsibility—namely, achieving and maintaining
low inflation—in a situation in which the currency was under attack
and the economy was overheating. Without the help of a contractionary
fiscal policy, all the weight of the expenditure reduction fell on mon-
etary policy. At the same time, the exchange rate adjustment that has
to accompany the expenditure reduction to avoid a sharp increase in
unemployment was postponed because of a fear of depreciation. This
fear was linked to the estimated inflationary effects of the depreciation
in an economy that was overheating when the first attack came.
In this section we use a small semi-structural model of the Chilean
economy to throw more light on these episodes. This type of model is
widely used in studies on Chilean inflation.38 Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel
(2001) use a similar model to assess the role played by the inflation-
targeting policy during the inflation reduction of the 1990s. The model
corresponds to a short-run version of a traditional small open economy
model. Models of the same type are commonly used in policy evalua-
tions by researchers and central banks.39
38. See, for example, Corbo (1985, 1998); Corbo and Fischer (1994); Edwards
(1993).
39. See, for example, Hargreaves (1999) for New Zealand; Beechey and oth-
ers (2000) for Australia; Cunningham and Haldane (2000), Bank of England (1999),
and Dhar, Pain, and Thomas (2000) for the United Kingdom.501 Growth and Adjustment in Chile:  A Look at the 1990s
The model used here closely follows the one used in Corbo and
Schmidt-Hebbel (2001), but we have made some modifications to ad-
dress the issue of interest, to capture the effect of the 1998 policy change.
Because we want to assess policy changes that occurred in late 1997
and early 1998, the dataset includes only information that was pub-
licly available by the end of the third quarter of 1997.
There is some international evidence on the use of revised data to
evaluate or study policy decisions made in a specific time moment. For
example, Runkle (1998) presents evidence that revisions of U.S. data
are important and that the differences between the first estimates and
the final values are sometimes large. Orphanides (2001), who focuses
on estimated Taylor rules, also emphasizes the striking divergences
that can emerge when policy actions are evaluated with ex post data
instead of real-time data
The estimated model is presented in equations 1 through 9 and also
summarized in table 8.
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the banking system. The inflation target announced by the Central





represents the annualized interna-
tional inflation. The annualized change in average wages is denoted
by
t ω
while the devaluation of the nominal exchange rate (Ch$ to the
US$) is denoted 
ˆt e
.
The output gap (
GAP t
) is computed as the log difference between
the seasonally adjusted quarterly GDP and its long-run trend, mea-
sured by the Hodrick-Prescott filter.41
GAP4t
is the four-quarter mov-
ing average of 
GAP t
.The gap in Chile’s main trading partners is la-
beled 
GAPXt
. We use 
LTOT t
to denote the logarithm of the terms of
trade,
LRERt
for the logarithm of the real exchange rate, and 
PRBCt
for
the real interest rate of the Central Bank bonds with ninety-day matu-
rity. Finally, capital  inflows 
CKt
and the current account balance
CAt
are computed at the end of each period and expressed as percent-
age of GDP, while 
RINt ∆
is the change in the foreign reserves of the
Central Bank, in dollars.
Each equation was estimated separately from the others to avoid
spillover effects from specification errors in a particular equation to the
estimation of other equations in the model. The estimation of equation 7
is more complicated because two of the right-hand variables depend on
observed values of the left-hand variable, creating an endogeneity prob-
lem (as explained in Clarida, Galí, and Gertler, 1998; Corbo, 2002).
Following previous work on the issue, we use generalized method of
moments (GMM) to obtain consistent estimators of the coefficients.42
Analyzing alternative scenarios
As cited above, Morandé (2001a) describes how the Central Bank’s
concerns about its ability to reach the inflation target pushed it to try
to avoid a major depreciation of the peso when the attack on the cur-
rency first developed in late 1997. In fact, the nominal exchange rate
depreciated more than 11 percent during the last days of 1997 and the
first days of January 1998. Had this depreciation been permanent, the
resulting effects on the inflation rate—the target of monetary policy—
40. Computed by the authors, linearizing the official target expressed as a
December-to-December rate of change.
41. Trend GDP was computed up to the third quarter of 1997.
42. For a review of generalized method of moments, see Hamilton (1994);
Greene (2000); Matyas (1998). For a review of previous works on the estimation of
monetary policy reaction functions, see Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1998) in the case
of developed countries and Corbo (2002) in the case of Latin American countries.Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
First period estimates are used in the simulations of the first semester of 1998. Second period estimates are used
in the simulations of the end of 1998 and 1999.
Table 8. Econometric Results
First period
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Second period
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would have depended on the pass-through coefficient. To analyze this
episode, we start by using the estimated model to determine the effect
of depreciation on inflation by late 1997. First, we solve the model dy-
namically for the year 1998 as a whole to see whether it fits the out-of-
sample data. The results are very different from the historical event.
This could be because of flaws on the model or because the structure of
the model changed after this period. We assess this point by replacing
equations with the observed values of some key variables; the results
are very interesting. The major differences stem from two variables:
the nominal exchange rate and the monetary policy real interest rate.
These two equations give poor forecasts even if we take into account
the observed values of the other variables. The model-simulated values
for the nominal depreciation are higher than the actual values, while
the simulated values for the real interest rate are lower than the ac-
tual values. In the same simulation exercise, the rest of variables per-
form quite well after taking into account the differences in the interest
rate and in the nominal devaluation.
If the problem is just with the two mentioned variables, then re-
placing them by their actual values should eliminate the problem; this
also serves as a test for the remaining equations of the model. As ex-
pected, the use of the actual values of the interest rate and the nominal
depreciation without further modifications of the model gives us fore-
cast values of the inflation rate very close to the actual ones. We there-
fore conclude that when we impose the new trajectory of the nominal
depreciation and the real interest rate that emerged after the third
quarter of 1997, the model explains the short-run structure of the
economy quite well. The simulated values from this amended model
are used as a benchmark to evaluate alternative policies.
The next step was to define the alternative scenarios to be consid-
ered for the counterfactual simulations. The first, and simpler, sce-
nario is the dynamic solution of the model using the estimated equa-
tions for the nominal depreciation and for the real interest rate. As
already mentioned, nominal depreciation is above actual depreciation,
core and headline CPI inflations are well above their actual values, and
the real interest rate is much below the actual interest rate. These
findings are consistent with those derived from the analysis using the
reduced-form VAR models described in section 3. Thus, the structural
changes associated with the reduction in the unremunerated reserve
requirement on capital inflows, in the exchange rate policy, and in the
design of monetary policy (the interpretation of the monetary policy
interest rate) had important effects, changing not only the parameters505 Growth and Adjustment in Chile:  A Look at the 1990s
of the equations, but also the values of the variables most closely af-
fected by policy actions. The most important point to single out is that
under the old structure, the shock was bound to result in an accelera-
tion of inflation that would have left the inflation rate for 1998 much
above the annual target, resulting in a loss of credibility for monetary
policy. This finding supports the point that monetary policy actions in
the first semester of 1998 were a response to an anticipation of an ac-
celeration of inflation above the target. Throughout this period, there
was a continuous tension between an expansionary fiscal policy and
the need to adjust the real exchange rate to facilitate the real deprecia-
tion that must accompany the expenditure reduction while keeping
inflation within the target. In this game of coordination between the
independent Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance, society was
forced to pay a higher cost in terms of the output gap and unemploy-
ment than would otherwise have been the case.
The second alternative scenario employs the uncovered interest
parity to compute the nominal depreciation expected by the market,
which was implicit in the spread between peso and dollar rates for the
same maturity and type of instrument. Although the empirical evi-
dence in favor of uncovered interest rate parity is weak, a recent paper
of Flood and Rose (2001) shows that it works quite well for periods of
high inflation and crisis. We use the uncovered interest rate parity to
obtain alternative paths for the nominal exchange rate devaluation.
We use two different assumptions to compute the behavior of the ex-
change rate in 199843. First, we compute the nominal exchange rate
from the uncovered interest rate parity condition for February 1998,
and then use the previously estimated equation to obtain the values for
the rest of the year. Second, we assume that after February the ex-
change rate follows a random walk with a drift, the latter measured as
the difference between internal and external inflation44. No matter which
assumption is made for the rest of the year, the results are qualita-
tively the same: an inflation rate well above both the target and the
effectively observed one. The differences are important; they represent
as much as one-third of the target set for the year. Table 9 presents the
43. To check the robustness of the conclusions, we also compute a third
scenario for the exchange rate by applying the actually observed monthly depre-
ciations to the level computed for February under the assumption of uncovered
interest parity. We thus obtain a monthly series of the nominal exchange rate
used to derive the four-quarter depreciations included in the model.
44. Which is equivalent to assuming purchasing power parity for the rest of
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results, both as deviations from the benchmark and as percentage of
the target.45 The table also contains two additional columns, in which
we recalculate the second scenario using the reaction function presented
in Corbo (2002), who uses the same data definition over a longer pe-
riod.46 The results confirm our analysis and also indicate some kind of
instability of the monetary policy reaction function. Corbo’s estimated
reaction function effectively implies a stronger reaction of monetary
authorities to expected deviations of inflation from the target.
Another key element in the setting of monetary policy was the size
of the pass-through coefficient from depreciation to inflation. According
to our estimation, the pass-through coefficient turned out to be smaller
than the 0.6 value mentioned in Morandé (2001a). Our estimated value
is 0.09 for the impact effect coefficient and 0.28 for the total or long-run
effect—about half of Morandé’s value. While the pass-through could
conceivably have been higher in an economy that was overheating, the
economy should have had a greater capacity to absorb a depreciation
with less effect on inflation, given that the equilibrium exchange rate
had increased as a result of changes in fundamentals.47
The reduction in the pass-through is not a phenomenon exclusive to
the Chilean economy. Cunningham and Haldane (2000) show that Eu-
rope underwent three remarkable experiences between 1992 and 1996,
in which CPI inflation did not show major changes after pronounced
shifts in the nominal exchange rate (both appreciations and deprecia-
tions). Taylor (2000) argues that the extent of the adjustment of prices
to changes in costs depends on expectations about how persistent the
changes will be—and an environment with reduced inflation persis-
tence generally gives rise to perceptions that the changes will last for a
shorter period.48 Choudhri and Hakura (2001) test the implications
derived by Taylor (2000) for a comprehensive set of countries for the
period 1979–2000. They confirm the existence of a positive relation be-
tween the pass-through and the average inflation level, which is related
45. Another robustness test was made by using the actual depreciation rates to
compute the nominal exchange rate for the whole year. This series obviously con-
tains a lot more information than anyone could have supposed by January 1998.
46. His estimations include information through year-end 1999.
47. Unfortunately, in our empirical work we were unable to find a relation
between the pass-through coefficient and the cycle.
48. Taylor also mentions a work by J. McCarthy of the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York, who documents the declining pass-through for nine OECD coun-
tries in a comparison of the periods 1976–1982 and 1983–1998. Goldfajn and Werlang
(2000) present a comprehensive study analyzing possible determinants of the
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.508 Vittorio Corbo and José A. Tessada
to Taylor’s idea about permanent and transitory effects. Policy implica-
tions of this result are straightforward: the sole existence of a credible
commitment to maintaining a low and stable inflation rate contributes
to a modification of expectations that proves crucial when a country faces
abrupt exchange rate fluctuations.
We now proceed to examine possible reasons behind the sharp con-
traction of monetary policy that occurred during the third quarter of
1998 in the midst of high pressure on the Chilean peso. We focus our
analysis on the trajectory of the inflation rate under alternative mon-
etary policies in the period from the second quarter of 1998 to year-end
1999, as controlling inflation is the main objective of monetary policy.
An alternative explanation for the sharp rise in the interest rate could
have been, as claimed by Morandé (2001b), to reduce the size of the
current account deficit. To determine the weight of these different con-
siderations, we re-estimate the model with the information available
through the end of the second quarter of 1998; we also recalculate trend
GDP with this new information.49 The estimated equations do not show
major changes in the values of the estimated coefficients, so the exer-
cise also serves as a robustness test for the entire model.
To uncover the possible influence of a concern for an acceleration of
the inflation rate in the decision to defend the peso and therefore to
resist a depreciation, we simulate a scenario similar to the one used for
the previous period. That is, we use the uncovered interest rate parity
condition to compute the expected devaluation rate in August and Sep-
tember of 1998, and we then use the estimated value to compute the
nominal exchange rate values in the hypothetical scenario of no de-
fense of the currency. The values in October, November, and December
1998 were computed using the monthly depreciation rate effectively
observed. We assume two alternative scenarios to compute the trajec-
tory in 1999, first using the estimated equation for the nominal devalu-
ation (scenario 7) and second assuming PPP (scenario 8). The forecast
values under scenario 7 are below the linearized target, but under sce-
nario 8 the value is close to the target (see figure 12).50 From this
exercise, we conclude that the risk of missing the inflation target was
not evident, and in any case it was much lower than in January 1998.
We now investigate the real costs associated with the alternative
strategies. We compare the forecast output gaps under a base scenario
49. The trend GDP was obtained using the Hodrick-Prescott filter.
50. In both scenarios the real interest rate of the PRBC-90 is modeled with
the estimated reaction function.509 Growth and Adjustment in Chile:  A Look at the 1990s
Figure 12. Core Inflation: Scenario 7, Scenario 8 and
Linearized Target
Source: Authors’ own calculation.
51. Alternatively, the model was also solved using the actual values for the
nominal exchange rate; the results did not significantly change.
52. Output gap is measured as the deviation from potential output as a per-
centage of potential or trend output.
(scenario 7 above), allowing for the nominal devaluation and using the
estimated reaction function to obtain monetary policy. The alternative
scenario (scenario 9) corresponds to the simulation of the model using
the observed values of the real interest rate for the entire period.51 The
differences in the simulated values of the output gap are very large
(figure 13). Throughout 1999, the output gap with the effective real
interest rate is well below the benchmark; this result is also valid in
the case of the real interest rate (figure 14). If we compute the cumu-
lative difference between both trajectories, the result is approximately
–10.5 percentage points.52 Had the nominal devaluation been allowed,
real output would have been much higher, on average, than what actu-
ally occurred under the extremely contractionary monetary policy.
Furthermore, the simulated reduction in the current account deficit is510 Vittorio Corbo and José A. Tessada
not as abrupt in either scenario as was effectively observed. Finally,
because the adjustment was carried out mainly through interest rates,
firms without access to dollar-denominated liabilities suffered the ma-
jor burden of the adjustment while the firms with net dollar liabilities
were protected from the adjustment. This was an implicit cost of rely-
ing mostly on monetary policy to face the threat of an acceleration of
inflation and reduce the size of the current account deficit.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The sharp slowdown of the Chilean economy starting in the second
quarter of 1998 has been a source of heated debate. This slowdown is
related to a series of negative shocks and the policy response to these
shocks. In particular, Chile suffered a series of external shocks—terms
of trade, increase in country risk, and contagion from the Asian and
Russian crises—while at the same time facing the highest interest rates
of the decade. Chile was using an inflation-targeting monetary policy
framework, but throughout, the Board of the Central Bank was also
keeping a close watch on the size of the current account deficit. The
main concern was that a high current account deficit would make the
country vulnerable to a sharp reversal in capital inflows. The crisis of
the early 1980s probably motivated this concern.
The deterioration in the external environment coincided with a very
expansionary cycle of the economy, and it set in motion several specu-
lative attacks on the exchange rate system, by this time an exchange
rate band. Policy adjustment to the shock and to the successive at-
tacks was not easy, since the cooperation between fiscal and monetary
policy was fairly weak. Indeed, the paper shows that the period of ad-
justment coincides with an expansionary fiscal policy, such that the
two policies worked at cross-purposes.
Much of the slowdown is traced to a sharp reduction in private
investment and consumption. The results of the analysis carried out
using both a nonstructural VAR model and a small structural model of
the Chilean economy indicate that much of the dynamic of the Chilean
economy in the post-1997 period can be explained by the external shocks
and the policy response to these shocks. The main episodes studied are
the ones related to attacks on the Chilean peso (January 1998, June
1998 and September 1998).
The results of the simulations with the VAR model estimated through
June 1998 and simulated through March 1999 show that aggregate
expenditures was bound to decelerate as a result of the shocks, althoughFigure 13. Output Gap: Scenario 9
Source: Authors’ own calculation.
Figure 14. Real Interest Rate (PRBC-90): Scenario 9512 Vittorio Corbo and José A. Tessada
its growth rate did not become negative. In contrast, when the simula-
tion is performed using the observed values of the real interest rate
instead of the VAR equation estimates, the resulting abrupt slowdown
in aggregate expenditures is slightly smoother than the observed trend,
but it basically follows the same dynamic through February-March
1999. This provides strong evidence that the posterior slowdown was
the result of monetary policy actions, both at the beginning of the simu-
lation period and during the months just before the simulation period.
Finally, we use this small macroeconomic model to analyze the
policy response to the speculative attack. With respect to the specula-
tive attack of January 1998, we find that under the old structure, the
shock was bound to result in an acceleration of inflation that would
have left the inflation rate for 1998 much above the annual target and
thus resulted in a loss of credibility for monetary policy. This finding
supports the point that monetary policy actions of the first semester of
1998 were a response to an anticipation of an acceleration of inflation
above the target. This result is robust to alternative assumptions about
the size of the exchange rate adjustment. When we use the same model
to analyze the August-September episode, we find that allowing the
exchange rate to depreciate did not impose a high risk of inflation ac-
celeration, and therefore other reasons must be found for this policy.
The cost of this policy in terms of the gap between actual and potential
output was significant.513 Growth and Adjustment in Chile:  A Look at the 1990s
APPENDIX A
Data Sources
The following series were obtained from the database of the Central
Bank of Chile: gross domestic product, domestic expenditure, trade
balance, current account balance, real prices of copper, inflation, un-
employment, real exchange rate, and the real interest rate (90-365 lend-
ing operations). Nominal oil prices were obtained from the Central Bank
database and deflated by the US WPI. Unemployment figures are from
INE (National Institutes of Statistics). The annual public sector bal-
ance was taken from Larraín and Vergara (2000) and corresponds to
the non-financial public sector balance.The quarterly series on public
sector balance were obtained from the Ministry of Finance (DIPRES)
and corresponds to the Central Government Balance. The data on terms
of trade were obtained from Bennett and Valdés (2001).514 Vittorio Corbo and José A. Tessada
APPENDIX B
Further Comments on the Role of Fiscal Policy
In this appendix, we briefly discuss two additional points that were
mentioned in the paper: the coordination between fiscal and monetary
policy and the estimation of the fiscal impulse for the period.
Fiscal and Monetary Policy Coordination in 1997–1998.
Almost every modern economy features the interaction of two mac-
roeconomic policies—fiscal and monetary—with each using its own in-
struments to achieve certain goals. When the central bank and mon-
etary policy are independent, the coordination of fiscal and monetary
policy becomes a central issue in the evolution of the economy. Under
certain circumstances, a lack of coordination between the two policies
could generate results that run contrary to the general purpose of the
central policy orientation and may increase the costs of economic down-
turns, in terms of the output gap (or unemployment) or output volatility.
A growing literature models this point as a game and then charac-
terizes the situation as a problem of strategy and coordination. Differ-
ent studies emphasize different elements that may lead to suboptimal
outcomes. Frankel (1998) highlights the problems that may arise when
there are differences in the model used to analyze the economy, such
that policy actions may differ even without different preferences. Bennett
and Loayza (2000) analyze a case in which there are different prefer-
ences, but only one model, with the fiscal authority concerned prima-
rily about unemployment and the monetary authority concerned pri-
marily about inflation.
In the case of Chile, the 1998 budget approved by the Congress in
1997 was expansionary. In fact, the assumption made about GDP growth
was above what was prudent in light of the highly uncertain evolution
of the world economy, as emerging economies were already feeling pres-
sure from the Asian crisis. Additional fiscal decisions, perhaps not di-
rectly affecting the budget, might also have had a perverse effect on the
evolution of private sector expenditures and wage arrangements. The
high adjustment made to the minimum wage, which was highly re-
sisted by employers, and the very high adjust to public sector wages
gave a bad signal to private sector workers. This was not a good idea in
the face of a very high current account deficit and a sudden stop in net
capital inflows. The required adjustment on aggregate expenditures
would be extremely difficult given an expansionary budget and a major515 Growth and Adjustment in Chile:  A Look at the 1990s
wage pressure on the labor market. A more conservative budget, com-
bined with lower wage adjustments, might have helped adjust domes-
tic demand without putting all the pressure on monetary policy. Fur-
thermore, given the deep concern about a possible overvaluation of the
peso, a moderate expansion of aggregate expenditures could have helped
avoid a large nominal and real depreciation, thereby reducing infla-
tionary pressures. These fiscal policy decisions forced monetary policy
to confront an important trade-off between the inflation target and the
possibility of deteriorated real activity given the large deterioration of
the external environment.
Estimating the Fiscal Impulse1
We base our estimation of the fiscal impulse on the Central Gov-
ernment accounts, including the Treasury, the ministries, and trans-
ferences to and from local governments, public enterprises, and public
universities.2 This definition is useful for our purposes because (a) local
governments are not able to raised debt, and if they present a deficit, it
must be financed by the Central Government; (b) universities are rela-
tively small (in financial terms) compared with the public sector; (c)
public enterprises, for the most part, post a surplus that is considered
in the Central Government accounting; and; (d) the Central Bank is an
independent institution.
Another topic that deserves special attention when estimating fis-
cal indicators is the selection of the fiscal aggregates to be considered
above the line, because choosing different aggregates may lead to dif-
ferent conclusions. In this study, we select those aggregates that seem
to have the most direct impact on domestic absorption, taking as a
starting point the selection carried out by the Government Budget Of-
fice (DIPRES) in the estimation of the Structural Budget Balance.3
One adjustment was necessary: we leave out copper incomes, because
its inclusion may lead to a completely opposite conclusion about right
fiscal stance. For example, if copper prices in a given period are higher
than an arbitrarily chosen neutral price, this would imply that the
government should implement a contractive policy, when actually the
1. This section draws on work in progress by Oscar Facusse.
2. These data are available at the Dirección de Presupuestos de Chile website
(www.dipres.cl).
3. For the estimation of the structural budget balance for 2002, DIPRES
changed its procedures to estimate recognition bonds. The old methodology better
suits our requirements here, however.516 Vittorio Corbo and José A. Tessada
effect on demand of this positive terms-of- trade shock would be just the
opposite (that is, an expansion of aggregate demand). Thus, the income
and expenditure aggregates were constructed as shown in table B1.
Adjusted income equals total income less loan recovery, sales of finan-
cial assets, returns on investment, and income from copper exports
(net of deposits and withdrawals from the Copper Price compensation
Fund FCC). Adjusted expenditures equals total expenditures plus the
net use of funds from the Oil Price Compensation Fund minus finan-
cial investment and estimated pension fund RB stock.4
Finally, we use the Hodrick-Prescott filter for the estimation of the
potential product, although we recognize the limitations that this method
imposes (in particular, the ending points problem). Considering its sim-
plicity, however, we conclude it is a good proxy for the potential product.
With all this in mind, we proceed to the construction of the annual
fiscal impulse. The results are shown in table B2. The calculations
were carried out using two similar methods. First, we calculate the
total impulse variable following the IMF method and using trend rev-
enues and expenditures as defined in selected Chilean issues (IMF, 2001).
Second, we calculate the total impulse using the following equation:
() ( ) 10 1 1 0 1 tt t t t t t t
t
t
EE g Y P Y P II t YY
FI
Y
−− − −    −− − − − − −    = (B.1)
where Et is adjusted expenditures in period t; It is adjusted incomes in
period t; YPt is potential product in period t; Yt is GDP in period t; g0 is
the average ratio of adjusted expenditure to potential product for the
years 1992–1997; and t0 is the average ratio of adjusted income to GDP
for the same period.
The two indicators present extremely close results, as expected,
which indicates that the government pursued an expansive fiscal policy
in the period 1995–1999, with a more expansive stance in the period
after 1997.
Next we estimate the quarterly fiscal impulse for the relevant pe-
riod (1997:1 to 2000:4). Here we use the equation presented above. The
4. FCC is a copper price-compensation fund. FEPP is an oil price-stabilization
fund. The RB stock represents mandatory government transfers to private pen-
sion funds cumulative under the previous public pension fund scheme (which was
changed in 1981); in this calculation, this is the stock of assets that are not sup-
posed to have direct macroeconomic impact. For more detail, see Marcel and
others (2001).517 Growth and Adjustment in Chile:  A Look at the 1990s
objective is to figure out what happened with the fiscal accounts during
the economic slowdown. The methodology is exactly the same as pre-
sented before, but on a quarterly basis.5 Here, g0 and t0 correspond to
the quarterly average for 1996, and the differences (Xt – Xt–1) consider
changes over four quarters.
Table B.1: Fiscal Aggregates Construction
Total Income Total Expenditure
- Loan recovering
- Financial assets selling - Financial Investment
- Investment return + FEPPb use of funds
- Copper net of FCCa - Estimated RB Stockc
Adjusted Incomes Adjusted Expenditures
a. FCC is a cooper price compensation fund.
b. FEPP is an oil price stabilization fund.
c. Due to the pension reform of 1981, the government transfers to the private pension funds the existing stock
of resources collected by the previous public scheme (RB). In this calculation, this stock of assets is asummed
to have no direct macroeconomic impact.
Table B.2: Fiscal Impulse (As a % of GDP)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Actual
Revenue 21.76 22.57 21.63 21.20 22.69 22.34 22.36 21.53 22.07
Expenditure 20.48 20.98 20.55 19.52 20.89 20.90 22.01 23.65 23.43
Trend
Revenue 19.30 19.30 19.30 19.30 19.30 19.30 19.30 19.30 19.30
Expenditure 22.91 22.98 23.24 22.37 22.10 21.80 22.00 23.20 23.10
Actual less Trend
Revenue 2.46 3.27 2.33 1.90 3.39 3.04 3.06 2.23 2.77
Expenditure -2.43 -1.99 -2.68 -2.85 -1.21 -0.90 0.01 0.45 0.33
Total Impulse -0.06 -0.37 0.25 0.26 0.16 0.65 0.90 1.27 -0.66
Revenue Impulse -0.56 -0.81 0.94 0.43 -1.49 0.34 -0.01 0.83 -0.54
Expenditure Impulse 0.50 0.44 -0.69 -0.17 1.65 0.30 0.91 0.44 -0.12
Total Impulse 2 -0.14 -0.39 0.19 0.14 0.13 0.68 0.89 1.27 -0.37
Source: Authors’ calculations.
5. Quarterly GDP was seasonally adjusted before detrending with a Hodrick-
Prescott filter. Here the fiscal aggregates were constructed without adjusting by
the FEPP owing to a lack of quarterly data, although the results do not present
significant changes.518 Vittorio Corbo and José A. Tessada
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